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Summary 
Contextualising my current philosophical preoccupations within the framework of 
my understanding of my task as a philosopher, I engage with the proposition that 
philosophers have a double task: firstly learning (and teaching) how to think, and 
relatedly, unexpectedly, learning/teaching how to laugh.  
 
Accepting that Philosophy has, first and foremost, styled itself as the discipline of 
thinking, the first half of the lecture offers a critical overview of Philosophy’s task 
of thinking. It is not controversial to describe Philosophy as deeper level critical 
thinking, or to say that Philosophy involves critical thinking about a certain kind 
of subject matter related to the meaning of life or the human condition. Philosophy 
traditionally asks what it means to be human, and considers: the nature of things; 
the meaning of freedom, love, compassion, identity; how best to live 
well; what counts as knowledge, truth, good, evil; how to understand divinity, 
treat others, create a just society; and so on. It is when philosophers look at their 
own activity or, that is, think about thinking, that the characterisation of the 
philosopher’s task becomes more contentious. The traditional explanation of what 
thinking means is challenged by a more contemporary explanation that takes 
account of complexity. The heart of the difference between these explanations lies 
in their different conceptions of “the truth”. On a traditional account, a truth is 
understood to be as a piece of knowledge about the human condition that one may 
have in hand forever. On a contemporary account, the truth is described as the 
insight that every aspect of the human condition reveals a precarious condition of 
radical uncertainty. Wary of the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by zealots who 
believe they have knowledge, in the discussion to follow, I embrace contemporary 
complexity thinking and the notion of “radical uncertainty”.  
 
In the second half of the lecture, I turn to the question of characterising Philosophy 
as more than an intellectual discipline of thinking. I consider Philosophy as a 
practice, or as a way of life. I engage specifically with a text by Nietzsche, Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra [1892] to put forward a way of practicing philosophy as the 
task of learning how to laugh well. Learning how to laugh well turns out to be an 
extremely complex ethical task. It involves a strategy of lifelong learning and 
teaching in which there is a shift from immature to mature versions of at least four 
kinds of laughter. Nietzsche offers gripping metaphors for three of these; namely, 
the laughters of the camel, lion and child. I draw the fourth metaphor from 
Nietzsche’s contrast between two kinds of “fire-dog”. The final “outcome” of the 
extremely difficult and laborious ethical task of learning to laugh (or, that is, the 
ethical task of self-overcoming or self-mastery) is the fittingly paradoxical 
insistence that it is ultimately necessary to renounce this outcome, since it 
represents a misconception of the ethical task as one of making linear progress 
from worse to better, ugly to beautiful, evil to good, and so on. Instead, immersion 
in a life of learning to laugh is its own reward, along with all of its pain, hardship, 
suffering and ugliness, as well as, importantly, the radical uncertainty of a better 
outcome. Nietzsche teaches us that the most important philosophical and ethical 
task is to make your tangible reality count so much that you can embrace its eternal 
recurrence. 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
 
It might seem ironic to tie Philosophy as a discipline to laughter. After all, in accordance with 
philosophy’s self-proclaimed seriousness, philosophers traditionally portray laughter as a 
weakness of passion that healthy thought can overcome. In the Leviathan (date), for example, 
Thomas Hobbes’ dismisses laughter as merely an ugly upsurge of self-congratulation, when 
you see yourself made glorious by the comparative infirmity of others. He thinks laughter 
should be despicable to any great philosophical mind. Defying, this attitude, Nietzsche (1966: 
§294) insists that laughter instead should be understood as the very way of being philosophical, 
and he is willing to “risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their 
laughter – all the way up to those capable of golden laughter.” Following Nietzsche, 
particularly in a reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra [1892] (2010), I hope to convince readers 
that understanding laughter as the very way of being philosophical is a viable and non-trivial 
ethical task.   
 
In order to tie philosophy to laughter convincingly, it is necessary to frame my particular 
understanding of my task as a philosopher. Philosophy has an extremely long and venerated 
“history of effects” (Gadamer 1998: 300), and there are probably as many conceptions of the 
philosophical task as there are philosophers and teachers of philosophy. As I see it philosophers 
have a double task: firstly learning (and teaching) how to think, and relatedly, unexpectedly, 
learning/teaching how to laugh. 
 
2. “What is Philosophy?” 
 
“But what is philosophy?” From the day I declared my love for philosophy the demand has not 
ceased for a clear answer to this question. Over many years, I have diligently striven to supply 
one. Now, after twenty-seven years of study, I think I am uncertain enough about the answer 
to start feeling wise. The allusion is to Socrates’ famous “doctrine of ignorance”, from Plato’s 
Apology [399 BCE] (1892a: 12). In dialogue with different experts, from politicians to poets 
and craftsmen, Socrates repeatedly came to the same conclusion: Regarding what he saw as 
the pretence of wisdom concerning the otherworldly, he asks: 
 
Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit 
that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe 
myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than 
they are:--that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose 
that I know (Plato 1892a: 12). 
 
Plato has Socrates argue here that he is the wiser person, since his interlocutors suppose they 
know something about the otherworldly, when they actually cannot, whereas Socrates is able 
to accept his own radical uncertainty. It is easy to trot this quotation out in a Philosophy 101 
course, but it is exceptionally difficult to embrace its truth and live with it. But exactly because 
of the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by zealots who believe they are uniquely in the know, 
if there is anything I want to walk away with after twenty-seven years, it is the skill, honesty 
and courage to embrace “radical uncertainty”.  
 
“Radical uncertainty” does not imply that there is no true answer (in this case about 
philosophy’s unique subject matter and what philosophers are supposed to do). Instead, it 
implies that the true answer is “uncertainty”. Keeping this in mind, I will venture a four-fold 
answer to the question, “What is philosophy?”: 1) Philosophy is thinking; 2) Philosophy is 
thinking about “the meaning of life”; 3) Philosophy is thinking about thinking; 4) Philosophy 
is a way of life.  
 
2.1 Philosophy is thinking 
First, philosophy involves deeper level, critical thinking. It involves disclosure, or aletheia to 
use Heidegger’s (1962: 105-106) poetic metaphor, meaning the act of drawing things back out 
of the river of forgetting. We think because we desire to uncover “the underlying truth” about 
the human condition.  
 
2.2 Philosophy is thinking about “the meaning of life” 
To be human is to open questioning eyes to the world, wonder about our place in and beyond 
it, and, perhaps since the first cave paintings, leave records of our speculations (Lewis-
Williams 2002). “Philosophy” names the deep thinking that seeks the truth about perennial 
questions concerning “the meaning of life”: the nature of things; the meaning of freedom, love, 
compassion, identity; how best to live well; what counts as knowledge, truth, good, evil; how 
to understand divinity, treat others, create a just society; and so on.  
  
2.3 Philosophy is thinking about thinking 
“Philosophy” (from the Greek words philos—love, and sophia—wisdom) emerged as a named 
discipline of thinking 2,500 years ago and explicitly becomes “thinking about thinking”. And 
this is tied to Philosophy’s elevation of Reason, in competition with the powerful authority 
over the meaning of life vested in the poets, politicians and craftsmen (the religious, 
mythological, social and practical storytellers). In this “game of thrones” Socrates was swatted 
out of existence like an annoying gadfly. But Plato gained enough power to set up the first 
Academy, and there are all kinds of ironies in the fact that so many subsequent famous 
philosophers, from Descartes to Nietzsche, philosophised “on the run” from academia.  
  
When philosophy is understood as “thinking about thinking” things become complex. 
Remaining with academic philosophy, Plato, in the Phaedrus [370 BCE] (1892b) articulated a 
formal theory of thinking, which has held sway with so few modifications for so long, that it is 
really hard to think of it as somebody’s fabrication. The brief outline to follow of what, right 
from Plato, we describe as “what we do when we think”, will probably sound like common 
sense. This outline is drawn from what Deleuze (1994: 129-167) has named “the dogmatic 
image of thought”. 
 
When we think:  (1) we seek truth, and we understand truth to be (2) knowledge. Knowledge, 
we say, is possible when our different faculties (perception, memory, imagination, 
understanding, reason etc.) (3) operate in harmony and we have the “good sense” to use/trust 
the right set of faculties for the right kind of object. When you say “seeing is believing”, for 
example, you implicitly put your trust in perception over memory or imagination. This makes 
(4) repeatable recognition of objects possible, and we understand misrecognition to be a form 
of error: a misapplication of our faculties, which can be corrected (if they are not damaged). 
So, we say that thinking can’t really intrinsically go wrong – it is (5) external mechanisms that 
cause errors, such as brain dysfunction or emotional distraction. We believe that we are 
thinking properly when we make propositions that (6) make sense. They make sense if they 
can be assessed as true or false, and we find it more acceptable to make “honest errors” than to 
produce nonsense or construct false problems. (7) A genuine problem, we say, is one that can 
potentially be solved and will disappear once the solution has been found. (8) We believe we 
have learned, then, when we pass from “not knowing” to an outcome called “knowledge”.  
 
Traditional Philosophy still works according to these eight postulates, but what drew my 
attention as a doctoral student was the Socratic aspect of philosophy; the radical uncertainty 
that was (ironically) both immortalised and suppressed in Plato’s writings and mostly 
suppressed in all the later “footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1978: 39). An alternative way of 
thinking about thinking, inspired by the “radical uncertainty” attributed to Socrates, only really 
gained currency recently (for Philosophy, “recently” means 100 years ago). In my studies, I 
followed a path from Kant’s famous “transcendental turn”, through Husserl’s phenomenology 
to contemporary post-structural thinkers, mainly Derrida, Lacan, and lately Deleuze, who were 
all strongly influenced by Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger. In my Doctoral dissertation I 
addressed the face-off between deconstruction and psychoanalysis, because I had found that 
both Derrida and Lacan, despite their discursive differences and proclaimed antagonisms, used 
the same, subversive, alternative way of thinking about thinking. They were both, at bottom, 
thinking according to the same logic of complexity. And it was this logic that interested me, as 
a very useful way of approaching the human condition (Hurst 2008). 
 
The bottom line of complexity thinking is that our means of access to perceptual, social and 
intellectual phenomena leaves us humans radically uncertain about almost every aspect of our 
being in the world. If uncertainty is the truth about the human condition, every postulate of “the 
dogmatic image of thought” is overturned (this “overturning” is the first and primary figure of 
laughter).  
 
I agree with Deleuze (1994: 129-167) that thinking does not take the form of a comfortable 
cognitive harmony. Instead, thinking is forced, mostly by a nasty shock where your faculties 
are involuntarily awakened by a threatening strangeness, and they can’t work together to “get 
your mind around” a thing. This means we genuinely think, only when we have difficulty in 
recognising. Thinking is not “problem-solving” but active problematization of what we thought 
was self-evident. It is a disruptive, polemical insistence on perplexity. Learning is not about 
knowing, it is about developing a capacity to respond sensitively to signs and creatively to 
perplexities. Also, the traditionally subversive figures – madness, absurdity, illusion, nonsense 
– are not always threats to thinking, but may turn out to be life-affirmative and desirable 
conditions that open up spaces for critical and creative thinking. The biggest threat to thinking 
is the stupidity of “good sense”, where you render the ineffable in terms of the conceivable 
(through proper propositions, arguments and problems) and take this narrowed down 
fabrication for truth. But why do we believe so firmly that things should be sense? Why is 
finding life’s meaning regularly posed as the ultimate goal?  
 
Once it is granted that the true answer is “uncertainty” it becomes noticeable everywhere. And 
isn’t another figure of laughter, self-contradiction, already inscribed in Plato’s text about 
thinking, the Phaedrus [370 BCE] (1892b), where a divine “madness” indicates access to 
deeper insights that reason cannot reach. Who is Socrates after all? Like Jesus, Siddhartha and 
Confucius, Socrates was indeed a historical figure – but Socrates never wrote anything down, 
and the most sustained account of who Socrates was, and of what Socrates said, comes from 
his role as the protagonist in Plato’s dialogues. Who is making Socrates say what? And, since 
these are dialogues between characters, can we ever be certain that Plato says anything at all in 
his own name?  
 
Before I tie philosophy more closely to laughter, it is important to add one more response to 
the “What is philosophy?” question. 
 
2.4 Philosophy is “a way of life” 
Following Pierre Hadot (1995: 267) philosophy may be seen “as a way of life”. Ancient 
philosophical schools shared a conviction that the philosopher’s task involved “speaking and 
thinking well” together with “acting in a correct and just way”. Today, in the disciplinary 
context of universities, it is considered enough to construct, study and critique diverse theories 
of self, world and society in a “technical jargon reserved for specialists.” On the one hand, I 
would be distressed if universities finally bolt their doors to “the life of the mind” or the purely 
intellectual life that gives rise to great philosophies. I do worry, on the other hand, that we 
academics are too comfortably placed as marginal figures whose ethical responsibility 
conveniently stops with criticism. Perhaps this keeps us too safe from personal obligations 
towards self-transformation, lifestyle change, or community building. It is disheartening to read 
inspirational books about “welcoming the other” and “hospitality” authored by philosophy 
professors at such war with one another that they and respective students and acolytes will not 
greet one another in the hallowed corridors of the academy. That said, living up to any 
philosophy is exceptionally difficult, and I am (of course) not sure what it would mean to 
orientate life practices and attitudes towards an existential expression of complexity. But I think 
that the deeply serious and subversive figure of laughter is a good candidate.  
 
3. Philosophy as Laughter in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is a great text for elaborating on laughter as a candidate for orientating 
an existential expression of complexity. By portraying the ethical development of the character, 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche indeed envisages how to practice philosophy as a way of life and this is 
a matter of learning how to laugh well.  
 
In what follows I aim to map out Zarathustra’s “learning curve”. I should mention that this 
“map” will not be found in a standard account of Nietzsche’s text. One may legitimately call it 
a violent imposition, or, in a more generous mode, an act of co-creation. I have formed it in the 
struggle to produce a creative “reading” that still pays due respect to the text. 
 
I see Zarathustra’s pathway as an upward spiral, in which he engages repeatedly, but at 
increasingly higher levels (in each turn of the spiral), with the three significant shades of 
laughter suggested by Walter Kaufman (a prominent Nietzsche scholar and translator). By 
virtue of each respectively, one is able finally to “slay the spirit of gravity,” “teach knowledge 
to smile”, and “pronounce laughter holy”. These forms of laughter may also be understood 
respectively as laughter that: “makes light of”; “laughs off” in emancipatory dismissal; and 
“finds joy”. Finally, each is represented respectively by Nietzsche’s metaphors of the camel, 
lion and child. I believe another shade of laughter must be added, by virtue of which you are 
able to slay the spirit of revenge. I think Nietzsche’s second fire-dog is an appropriate symbol 
for this, and the related shade of laughter is laughter that “laughs at” any form of power 
struggle. 
 
The upward spiral is nevertheless driven by what Nietzsche calls “the will-to-power”. Roughly, 
desire for power has turned inwards and takes the elevated form of self-overcoming. This 
conjoins two more laughters: a) backward-looking, self-destructive mockery of our own 
naïvetes, stupidities and vanities etc; b) a forward looking, surprised delight at new insights. 
Our negative, mocking resentment about our own deficiencies (rather than blank ignorance of, 
or indifference to, them), already inscribes a belief in our perfectibility (you can only resent a 
deficiency if it can be changed) and a longing for healing that stems from love, understood as 
the passion to lure the human monster towards self-overcoming, in the joyous affirmation of 
our potential to be so much more. 
 
Beginning with the backstory of Nietzsche’s narrative, for the first 30 years of his life, 
Zarathustra was presumably consumed with the ugly, petty laughters that emerge from base 
forms of resentment and will-to-power and keep an in-group bound together by a notion of 
equality tied to mere sameness. Basically, lust for power-over another stems from a fear of not 
being equal enough - vengeance, retribution and punishment all aim to restore sameness, and 
balance power. We take revenge on difference – if they outshine us too far we pull them down 
by mockery; if they are beneath us, we punish their weakness through dehumanising ridicule. 
Security stems from being part of the in-group where people are trained to share the habitual, 
superficial, drunken joys of self-forgetting and petty sniggering of easy comfort. 
 
Zarathustra’s journey starts when he awakens to self-disgust - a higher form of resentment, 
represented in the vengeful self-mockery of the great despisers. [These are our contemporary 
stand-up comedians and satirists]. In self-mockery I upbraid myself – and humanity by 
implication – for petty weaknesses. This form of laughter, as mentioned, has the energy to drive 
the will to power in its guise as self-mastery. But left to its own devices, self-mockery becomes 
self-destructive (the unhappy clown is a stereotype) and, as initially such a buffoon, Zarathustra 
eventually must “take his ashes to the mountains”. Realising that “Not by wrath, but by 
laughter, do we slay” (Nietzsche 2010: 37) he begins teaching himself to laugh well. 
 
Still part of the backstory, Zarathustra spends ten years in isolation mastering camel, lion and 
child laughter. But he also discovers that individual self-overcoming is incomplete. Addressing 
the sun he asks: “What would your happiness be, had you not those for whom you shine?” 
(Nietzsche 2010: 37). The sub-text here is Plato’s insistence philosophy’s most prominent task 
is to teach. Zarathustra therefore comes down from the mountain, and starts the long 
confrontation, detailed in the book, with the power dynamics of the teacher/learner relationship.  
 
Part 1 of the text covers Zarathustra’s attempts to teach others about laughter through telling; 
that is, through sermons, parables, and metaphors. These encounters teach him that people are 
not equally open to his words, and he needs to engage with a few willing companions rather 
than the masses. Having spent time with a select group, he realises he has now attracted 
believers rather than genuine companions in learning. He has to overcome this asymmetrical 
power-relation: undo his own attachment to it, release the believers, and attract/give birth to 
genuine companions, who themselves can learn/teach at a higher level. Part 2 roughly covers 
a time of teaching/learning through shared experiences, periodic isolations, returns and 
wanderings, culminating in the Happy Isles (Nietzsche’s version of the Epicurean Garden). But 
Zarathustra is not done yet with the will to power, and in what he calls his stillest hour has to 
begin confronting the challenge posed by the thought of “eternal return”. Part 3 covers 
Zarathustra’s period of isolation and convalescence, marked by the command “physician heal 
yourself” (Nietzsche 2010: 65). 
 
Before I turn to Part 4, where Zarathustra re-connects with flawed humanity, in a process of 
making peace with the eternal return, it is necessary to give this movement of self-overcoming 
some substance by showing the following: 1) How camel laughter develops towards slaying 
the spirit of gravity; 2) How lion laughter develops towards teaching knowledge to smile; 3) 
How child laughter develops towards making laughter holy; and 4) How a shift from the first 
to the second fire-dog overcomes the spirit of revenge. This shows in detail what it means to 
learn to laugh well. 
 
3.1 How camel laughter develops towards slaying the spirit of gravity  
Camel laughter is a strengthening laughter through which you develop the courage to “make 
light of” the heavy: both burdens of constraint and emotional heaviness. Its development in 
Zarathustra, from Part 1 through to Part 3 involves,  first, the task of making light of 
discomforts, sufferings, and unhappinesses by embracing them. This is a matter of 
strengthening yourself to carry the burdens. Then Zarathustra in effect advises one to choose 
carefully what burdens to bear. The injunction is to stop loading yourself with externally 
imposed burdens. Then you are advised to detach from your resignation to the unhappiness of 
life and your gratefulness for minor consolations, even if it causes despair because you now 
don’t know how to live. It becomes time to face your fear of the abyss which replaces the solid 
ground to which gravity attaches you. Nietzsche’s metaphor for this is to “bite off the head of 
the snake” to wrestle with and tear out the down-dragging heaviness of: despair, depression, 
horror, hatred, loathing, and pity. The laughter of release from the need to suffer, readies you 
for the self-shattering flash of lightening and the laugh of exaltation when you see that 
lightening does not harm you. Then the task is to make lightening work for you – blind others 
with your wisdom. But then, it is essential to learn to make light of the naïve, arrogant, hubristic 
way you have laughed at the spirit of gravity. How do you laugh at this? Nietzsche proposes 
that you face with courage the emerging thought of the eternal return. In this affirmation, you 
become a light-hearted “blesser and a Yes-sayer” surrounded by an “abyss of light!”  
 
The other three shades of laughter follow a similar kind of trajectory. Lion laughter by which 
you teach knowledge to smile begins with “laughing off” as unimportant, petty, irrelevant, 
trivial the self-satisfied injunctions that come from those “wise, knowing and learned ones” 
supposedly “in the know”, but who hold unthinkingly, habitually to rigid binary values in all 
domains (virtue/vices, purpose/chance, order/disorder). It reaches its zenith in the laugh that 
erupts when your mind/your thinking is freed for your “final lion-wantonness and playfulness”. 
 
Child laughter begins with the recognition that God is dead and the acknowledgement of the 
need to prepare yourself - as a precursor to the new game of life. The first task is to seek 
innocence through forgetting the God phantom and its gloomy fire and brimstone rhetoric, and 
purifying yourself of the toxic old religious ways of the “good and the just”. Once this is 
achieved, you are ready to become pregnant with your new self and with the others you will 
deliver as companion creators; and the pregnancy involves: the joyful laughter of a sacred "yes" 
to life: Yes to traces of the overman in yourself; Yes to your body – become a dancer; Yes to 
the earth rather than the otherworldly illusion; Yes to traces of the overman in others; Yes to 
the responsibility for creating the new beginning, with the available earthly principles (riddles, 
chance) 
 
The laughter of the second “fire-dog” by virtue of which you slay the spirit of revenge, begins 
by embracing the mockery of the self-despisers instead of taking revenge on the different (via 
envy of the above, ridicule of the below). But, Nietzsche warns, handle the violence of mockery 
with care, or it will cripple you. This is not to overcome violence as such, but embrace the 
necessary violence of self-shattering that unbalances and destroys a deadening equilibrium in 
order to open the old to the new. Nietzsche imagines the second fire-dog, as one whose violent 
disruptive laughter, like a volcano, unleashes a flow of gold. To reach this kind of laughter you 
need to learn to combine mockery with inspiring love for the overman. In this love, you desire 
to share and to draw others upward with you. In the various teacher/learner relationships 
(audience, companions, believers, followers, children) you learn to accept that not all humans 
are equal. Finally Nietzsche asks you to learn to love humankind not only for its promise/beauty 
but equally for its folly/ugliness since self-overcoming only moves when you inflict a special 
kind of violence on human uglinesses – and that means that these uglinesses have to be there – 
because the new only arises out of their breaking down.  
 
Finally, the apex of the upward spiral you are exhorted to face the thought of “eternal return”. 
Imagine, Nietzsche (2001: Section 341, 194) proposes, that “life, as you now live it, and have 
lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new 
in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and everything 
unspeakably small and great in your life” must repeat exactly as it is over and over again. In 
other words, if this were a game of “snakes and ladders”, Nietzsche’s snake (not for nothing 
the sign of ultimate wisdom), would be on the final rather than the penultimate block. To win 
this game is to lose it in the endless circulation of the eternal recurrence. 
 
Nietzsche knows that the culmination of Zarathustra’s learning curve in the thought of the 
eternal recurrence undoes the “will-to-power” as the elevated combination of self-mockery and 
delight that leads to self-overcoming. Eternal return makes a mockery of Zarathustra’s teaching 
of self-overcoming as an “outcome”. But why would he ask us to follow Zarathustra in minute 
detail along the spiral pathway by means of which he learns and teaches you to strive for self-
overcoming? I think the answer can be offered in Lacan’s (1992: 311) aphorism, “assume your 
desire”. It is only after you have taken up your desire with dedication, invested whole-heartedly 
in it, pursued it and pushed it to its limit that you genuinely learn how it fails. Only then are 
you qualified to let it go. Zarathustra’s teaching of the overman as an outcome should be 
ridiculed in face of the eternal return. Nietzsche reminds us that life’s value does not lie in the 
linear progression to an illusory future ideal outcome: from ugliness to beauty, misery to 
happiness, deficit to perfection, ignorance to knowledge, etc. Instead, it lies in “learning to 
laugh” in learning to love life without trying to fix it, and for this learning, you need to be 
immersed in a complex, contaminated, tangible reality, here and now on earth, which includes 
the paradoxes of ugliness within its beauty, misery within its happiness, evil within its good, 
and so on. Importantly, the perspective from which Zarathustra finally comes to ridicule his 
own teaching – having undertaken his journey – is entirely different from the perspective from 
which the mean-spirited are doomed to ridicule it – not having undertaken any such journey. 
Those who have not pursued the quest for self-overcoming to its limits can only fearfully mock 
Zarathustra in a way that puts everyone in danger. When they think of Zarathustra as a buffoon 
their laughter might be dismissively benign, when they perceive him as a devil, their laughter 
is lethal – the line between the two is extremely fine. By contrast, in pursuing, but losing your 
desire for self-overcoming, you learn a life-preserving skill along the way. You learn how to 
laugh well. This entails, to reiterate, laughing the camel laugh that refuses to give in to 
tiredness, dejection, cowardice and depression; laughing the lion laugh that refuses to give your 
brain over to orders from above, or to normalising reason; laughing like a child who will not 
defer  joy to the future that will never come, and refusing to waste your golden fire-dog energy 
on senseless power struggles. All of this, it seems to me, are ethical tasks of primary 
importance. 
 
To conclude, allow me to bring the discussion back briefly to the notion of “radical 
uncertainty”. The injunction to affirm the eternal recurrence of your exact life over and over 
does not save you from the radical uncertainty of your here and now lifetime as you live it 
through. In fact, Nietzsche’s primary worry was our blindness to the here and now when we 
try to escape the terrifying uncertainties of the human condition by fixing our gaze on some 
otherworldly fantasy along the well-trodden lines of a paradise lost, hell on earth and the 
heavenly future that will make it all better again. In fixing your gaze on any otherworldly 
fantasy of a better future, you end up sleep walking through this life. The injunction to laugh 
is also a call to love life – to want to be “alive to” experiences in all the lucid vivacity of their 
pain and joy. In this realisation, Nietzsche’s “g olden laughter” erupts as you slide down 
the snake, shouting “YES! All of it. All again”! 
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